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BUENOS AYRES.

Well, the long-expected affair up the Paraná has at last come off, and, whether regarded in a commercial or a military point of view, a sorry affair has it been for the hostile intruders. The following letter from an actor in the scene gives all the authentic information we can yet lay before our readers :—

"Quebracho, June 4, 1846.

"From a quarter to 11 A.M. to 2 P.M., to-day, we have sustained an engagement with our cruel enemies the Anglo-French in their descent down the river. The piratical convoy consisted of 95 merchantmen, led by 12 ships of war, viz.: the steamers *Firebrand*, *Gorgon*, *Alecto*, *Lizard* and *Harpy*, brigantine *Dolphin* and brig *Fanny*, British; and the steamers *Gassendi* and *Fulton*, corvette *Coquette*, brig *San Martin*, and brigantine *Procida*, French; mounting, in all, 85 guns of various calibres from 24 to 80 pounds. To oppose this formidable array besides a battery of 3 pieces placed the night previous on an island in front of our principal position, we had only 17 pieces of flying artillery and 500 infantry. At the hour abovementioned the enemy commenced a tremendous fire upon our positions, with the view of protecting the convoy. We returned it in a spirited manner, not losing sight of the merchantmen, whose cupidity had led them into the scrape. At half-past meridian, a British barque of about 250 tons burthen, (supposed to be the *Holywood* or the *Caledonia*) and 3 schooners, one of them pilot-boat-rigged under Correntino colours, in their endeavour to avoid our fire, got aground on a bank near an island on the opposite coast. Five of the enemy's largest steamers proceeded to their assistance, but finding our fire too hot for them, they relinquished the undertaking, and fled at full speed. Subsequently the *Lizard* was sent on the same errand, but had it not been for the timely aid of two large steamers which returned to protect her she would inevitably have been destroyed. At 2 P. M. the firing entirely ceased, the enemy having set fire to and abandoned the vessels aground. The latter were soon consumed, with the exception of the pilot-boat rigged schooner, laden with hides, yerba, and tobacco, which was rescued from the flames by four boats despatched by us from the shore. The greater part of the merchantmen threw their deck-loads over board, in order to avoid grounding, and we could see tercios of yerba and petacones of tobacco consigned to the water, intermingled with the bodies of the killed. I believe 32 of the latter have been counted. Both the vessels of war and merchantmen were completely riddled with our shot. It will take them some time to repair before they can proceed on their voyage. They have here, as well as at Obligado, dearly paid for the *gusto* of navigating our interior waters. A sad experience has taught them that it cannot be indulged with impunity; but I do'nt think there will be any desire to attempt it again. After a voyage of 8 months, which has produced nothing but heartburnings and disappointments, and to which there is now to be added a fresh loss of not less than £30,000, the Montevideo speculators will be haunted no longer with golden visions in respect to the Paraná. Even should the hallucination continue, there is reason to believe that the British and French Ministers will pause ere they send again their vessels of war on such a perilous and inglorious service.

"Our 17 pieces have fired 1,360 shots, grape and round, and our infantry 20,000. The enemy must have fired at least 2,500 shots and 200 Congreve rockets. The only casualities we have to lament are 1 infantry soldier killed, Lieut. Col. Thorne and 4 soldiers wounded, the former slightly in the left shoulder."

It is allowed on all hands that General Mancilla displayed on this occasion his usual *sang froid*, and had every reason to be satisfied with the officers and men who fought under his command. From the Commander-in-chief to the lowest soldier, all proved themselves worthy of the renown they so nobly earned at Obligado.

We have had this week some relief to the monotony of blockade. In fact, the beach on Monday last was a scene of stirring excitement, in consequence of the following occurrences. It appears that the favourable breeze which had been blowing since the 7th inst, had induced the masters of several small coasting vessels to put off from the opposite coast, with the intention of traversing the waters of La Plata in spite of the blockaders. Three were seen early on the morning of the 8th at anchor close in to the shore. At about 10 A. M. three others were observed through the fog making every exertion to reach it, closely pursued by two boats belonging to H B M brig *Racer*. The Captain of the Port, who with his customary zeal was on the *qui vive*, ready to render the coasters every assistance, no sooner saw the chase, than he ordered two guns to be brought down to the water's edge with which, according as the fog allowed an occasional glimpse of the blockaders, he sent them a cooler in the shape of a goodly twelve pound shot to allay the ardour of the pursuit. The preventive had the desired effect, and the jolly tars, doubtless convinced by such strong arguments that it was "no go," very promptly gave the shore a wide berth. In the mean time, carts had gone off from the shore and discharged the cargoes contained in two of the craft alluded to, while the third unfortunately bilged in consequence of having a piece of one of her sides stove in by striking against the wheel of one of the carts which had gone alongside for the above purpose. While these events were passing, the fog cleared off; two other boats filled with numerous crews were seen in the distance between the blockading vessels and the shore; the *Racer* fired a gun and hoisted a signal, and another craft appearing in the direction of Point Quilines, standing in with the apparent intention of entering the Boca, one of the Racer's boats already mentioned gave chase till within a very short distance of the craft, at which time two armed boats and a launch emerging from the Boca settled the matter by the two former pulling up alongside. Several shots were exchanged between the boats but without effect, and the blockaders thus foiled a second time, returned to their vessels without even having the satisfaction of setting fire to or otherwise destroying the vessels as is their wont "in behalf of humanity and civilization" and of which we have not long since quoted an example in the detail of their proceedings at Ensenada. The pursued craft had been intentionally run aground by the crew but by throwing a portfon of her cargo overboard, which was subsequently picked up, she got off, and arrived at the Boca in the afternoon.

We had omitted to state that on the above occasion several shots had been also fired from the Fort and from the battery Libertad at the blockaders. The affair brought down great numbers of spectators from the higher parts of the town to the shore, and it required no deep study to fathom the feelings of the assembled multitude through which ever and anon ran a bu zz of delight as a ball fell near the boat at which it had been aimed. "Straws," it has been said, "show how the wind blows," and such demonstrations require no comment, since they sufficiently explain themselves.

General Mancilla's Letter of defiance to Capt. Hotham.

I impeach Captaiu Hotham as a trothless gentleman, and unveritable in his dispatch to the Admiralty of his country, published in the "Journal des Debats" of 2nd March, inasmuch as utterly disregarding truth he has lost sight of that highmindedness which at all times, and in any part of the world distinguishes the brave; and, confining myself to three points, I declare in the face of the universe.

1st—That it is false that previous to the action of the 20th any vessel presented itself in front of my position or at a distance less than two miles on my right flank; whence it is to be inferred that they absolutely did not reconnoitre, nor could they draw a plan, as they should have done, before engaging.

2ndly—That it is ridiculous and shamefully false that the 21 guns (and not 22) which they found, the greater part dismounted, when they disembarked in consequence of my ammunition having been spent were of the calibres, of 32, 28, 24, 18 and 12, but only three of 24, two of 18, six of 16, two of 12, seven of 10, nine of 8, and six of 4.

3dly—That it is also false and ridiculous that there were ten vessels of war at Obligado. The only one there was the Brig *Republicano*, which its gallant commander blew up when his ammunition was spent. How is it he does not add the artillery of these ten vessels in the enumeration which he makes in his dispatch of the supposed twenty-two guns? How is it he says nothing of the manœuvres of these vessels during the action?

From this scandalous mode of lying it will be clearly seen that the object of Captain Hotham has been no other that of taking his Admiralty and country by surprise by presenting a bulk which did not exist, in the expectation, doubtless of obtaining promotion, which if well deserved by the gallant men who for nine hours fought against the positions under my command no one do I believe less worthy of it than Captain Hotham.

Waiving a thousand other discrepancies I refer in every thing to the faithful report which Colonel D Francisco Crespo drew up by my order, which I beg of Messieurs the Editors to insert at full length together with this; and as regards the points to which I have made reference, I appeal to the rectitude of all the gentlemen officers of the Anglo-French squadron, who with as much valour as skill fought on that day; it being understood that if any person or persons like Captain Hotham should dare to gainsay me, at any time, in any place, what is said by the pen is sustained by the sword of

General Mancilla.

Wide of the truth as is Capt. Hotham's report, it is but fair to that officer to say, that it is not more exaggerated, and considerably less bombastic, than that of his French colleague Capt. Trehouart. Only think of the latter sending to his Admiral, with the ulterior design, no doubt, of being forwarded to Paris, for the purpose of gracing the walls of the *Hotel des Invalides*, the flags belonging to the merchant craft which formed the estacade across the river, and the pennons that waved before the soldiers' cabins at Obligado! With what modest trophies are the descendants of Republican and Imperial France now satisfied! Capt. Hotham, at least in this respect, has shewn more good sense; nor has he had the effrontery to brag that the purloined brig *San Martin* is the vessel that once bore the flag of *Commander* Brown! This littleness of soul belongs solely to the new Rear-Admiral of the French navy.

An Appeal on behalf of the British Subjects residing in and connected with the River Plate, against any further violent Intervention by the British and French Governments in the affairs of that country.

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(Continued.)

Neither, perhaps, would it be easy to prove to other nations that the conduct of our own Government is altogether beyond suspicion in this respect. The impartiality that has been professed at home has not been put in practice at the scene of action. Many measures which were calculated to hasten the termination of the war—amongst which we may particularly mention the blockade of Montevideo—were opposed and prevented by our officers on the station, in manifest breach of our neutrality; and the prolongation of the war which Oribe is justly entitled to attribute to our own acts and those of the French, is now assigned by us as one of the principal grounds for our interfering to finish it—not *for*, but *against* him.

If these circumstances have indisposed Oribe from viewing our intervention with a favourable eye, it can scarcely be wondered at. In whichever direction he looks throughout the affair, he sees nothing but foreign intermeddling. The sons of the soil are altogether thrown in the background. Foreigners caused the war—foreigners have carried it on,—foreigners have ever interposed to prevent its ending,—foreigners are in possession of his capital city, and holding it out against the almost unanimous consent of the natives,—and, last of all, two foreign nations gravely come forward to blame him for the acts of their own subjects, and to second them. Those who complain that he has not readily consented to the sacrifices we have demanded of him, can scarcely, we think, have made due allowance for these circumstances.

The peculiar system of hostilities by which our Government seem to expect to carry their point, will, it is feared, be found as disastrouss to third and innocent parties, as it will be inoperative on those against whom it is directed. For three years Buenos Ayres withstood the blockade of the French, and it was then only ended by their greatly modifying their pretensions. The power of General Rosas was then not nearly so firmly established as it is now—his enemies were far more numerous and confident—the blockade was a new weapon of offence to him—its weakness had not then been proved—nor was he prepared for it as he now is. Taking all these things into account, it may be concluded that we have even less chance of gaining our end by the blockade than the French had, and that if Rosas then stood for three years, he now may for twice three.

We are also in a much more disadvantageous situation for conducting it than they were. After they had turned out Oribe from Montevideo, they had the whole of the resources of that republic at their disposal, both for aiding their warlike operations and for refitting and provisioning their squadron. We, on the contrary, have not the means of buying a single pound of fresh provisions, because every inch of ground on both sides of the river is in possession of Rosas and Oribe, excepting the city of Montevideo, Colonia, and one or two other points that we may have taken. Even these, instead of being a help to us, are the reverse, for they are so closely invested by land, that they are in the greatest straits for provisions, and the price of fresh beef in Montevideo, which in ordinary times is about one penny per lb., was, according to the last advices, about two shillings, besides being very bad, having to be brought by sea from the Brazils. Poultry, eggs, and all other such articles were equally dear.

Some reliance is apparently placed by the British agents in the Plate on the co-operation of the people of Corrientes, who are in revolt against the authority of Buenos Ayres, and an attempt was about to be made to effect a junction with them by means of an expedition of our war steamers up the river Paranà. They are, however, known to be destitute of every thing that is necessary—and should they be induced by us to leave their shelter, and take the field against the veteran troops of Oribe's generals, it is very much to be feared that we shall have to answer for their destruction.

Our position in the Plate therefore is this. We have possession of the rivers—and of any point on the coast we may choose to take. The authorities we are in opposition to have possession of the whole of the country—of the food—and of what is there the most important implement of warfare—the *horses*. If we take a point on the coast, we do not get an inch of ground with it. For that, we require troops, and above all *cavalry*. Our squadron, and the population of Montevideo and of the other points in our possession, must live entirely upon imported food, which we must pay for. Meanwhile the troops of Oribe are living in clover—all they are used to is beef, and they have at their disposal the cattle of the whole country without any need of paying for it. Such few foreign articles as they need they can purchase from the Brazils, whose frontier joins theirs, and the wants of their exchequer can at all times be readily supplied by sales of cattle to the Brazilians, who are ready customers for them. Oribe is thus untouched by our operations, and it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that to blockade our own Portsmouth or Liverpool would be almost as likely a method of effecting what we wish as the blockades we are instituting in the River Plate.

We have not yet adverted, except cursorily, to the interests of the merchants and others connected with the River Plate, but justice requires these should not be overlooked. They complain that the war has already been prolonged for three years by the intermeddling of the British agents and officers. Had strict impartiality been observed by these, Montevideo would, upon the defeat of Rivera in 1842, have received back Oribe as President; and many times since then the end of the strife was seen to be at hand, if it had not been warded off by foreign interference. So directly have our efforts tended to prolong the war, that a bystander would have supposed we thought our interest lay in doing so. The result has been the loss of nearly all the debts due in the country to the merchants, amounting to upwards of half a million sterling, the destruction of a great deal of other British property, and the loss to them of three years' trade. The more open intervention now commenced will, instead of repairing or in any way compensating for these losses, on the contrary prolong and extend them. No trade of any consequence can exist in Montevideo under such circumstance as we have described, so that to the three years already lost will be added we know not how many more. In Buenos Ayres, also, will be repeated what has occurred at Montevideo, but on a much larger scale. There will be the same loss there of present debts and of future trade. The number of British settlers engaged in rural and other pursuits is very large, and a continuance of the blockade will ruin most of them and seriously injure all. It has not been thought an exaggerated estimate to reckon the probable loss to British subjects, from a persistance in the late fatal measures, at more than two millions sterling.

The merchants during the trying circumstances of the last four years were in the habit of looking up to Her Majesty's Ministers as their best and, indeed, their only guides in the regulation of their operations; and relying upon their repeated assurances in Parliament that they would not interfere, further than by making the offer of their friendly mediation, they were altogether taken by surprise by the late proceedings. Had the slightest indication been given of any intention of adopting violent measures, they would assuredly have at once suspended their shipments to Buenos Ayres, and brought their affairs generally into the very smallest possible compass. In this way they would have escaped any serious actual loss of property, and would only have had to complain of the deprivation of their trade, which, even by itself, however, would have been no trifling evil. But as it is, they feel they have been misled—not intentionally they believe, but from want of due consideration—and that they have been placed in their present unpleasant situation by the inconsiderateness and inconsistency of those whose high position makes such faults extensively and fatally injurious.

Nor has any change in the position of affairs occurred since Ministers made the declarations referred to which can account for the change in their conduct. Everything remains as it was, except that the cause of our protegés having become more helpless, the success of our interference is rendered more hopeless. If it be said the war has now lasted so long that it was high time we should put a stop to it, it may be replied that it is entirely our own fault it was not finished long ago, and that what we are now about to do will not shorten it, but on the contrary indefinitely prolong it.

We cannot help specially directing attention to a few examples of the contradiction between the declarations of Ministers and the proceedings of their agents. Lord Aberdeen declared * that Buenos Ayres, was the lawful authority for closing the rivers, and yet her having done so in prosecution of her belligerent rights is one of the heaviest charges brought against her, and a British force is, probably at this very moment, engaged in forcing them open against the will of this same lawful authority. Sir Robert Peel showed,† in the clearest manner, how useless it would be for us try to suppress the hosti-

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* *Extract from the Speech of Lord Aberdeen.*

28th June, 1845, (Morning Chronicle.)

The Earl of Aberdeen said he should be most happy to contribute, by any means in his power, to open the navigation of the Plate, or any other river in any part of the world, to facilitate and extend the commerce of this country; but it was not so easy a matter as the Petitioners supposed to open that *which lawful authorities had declared should be closed.*

The Petitioners had spoken of a Treaty with this country, by which they alleged they were entitled to the navigation of the River Plate. *Now Buenos Ayres was the only organ of the combined States with which foreign powers could deal. Some of the Provinces had revolted, and war was now waging between them.* That their Lordships might judge of the manner in which the Petitioners had put forward their claims under the Treaty, he would compare their statement with the Treaty itself.

The Petitioners alleged that by this Treaty there should be reciprocal freedom of commerce between Great Britain and the United Provinces, and perfect freedom and security for British subjects there.

Now the article of the Treaty referred to was to this effect, "That there should be between all the "Territories of Her Britannic Majesty in Europe and "the Territories of the United Provinces of Rio de la "Plata reciprocal freedom of commerce; that the "British should have liberty to come with their ships "into all the Ports of the Territories aforesaid, '*into* "*which other foreigners are and may be permitted* "*to come.*'" (Hear, hear, hear!) Therefore it appeared by the article of the Treaty that this country had only a right to claim that which was granted to other foreigners.

The article went on to say that the inhabitants of the two countries should enjoy perfect security for their commerce, "subject to the laws and statutes of the two countries respectively," so that this country was at the mercy of a foreign state choosing to make laws restrictive of free commerce, provided they gave us all that was enjoyed by the most favoured nations. (Hear.)

This country was now engaged in the endeavour to restore peace in the River Plate, and he hoped that the result would be an improvement in the present state of things, and a great extension of our commerce in those regions. *But we should lose more than we could possibly gain, if in dealing with these States we lost sight of the principles of justice.* (Hear, hear.) *They might be unwise in their commercial policy, and they might be following out a system which we might think imprudent and injurious as regarded their own interest as well as ours; but we were bound to respect the right of independent nations, be they weak or be they strong.*

† *Extract from the Speeches of Sir Robert Peel.*

9th March, 1844 (Times).

Sir Robert Peel—This war, it was not perhaps known, *was not a conflict so much between the Buenos Ayreans and the Montevideans as between party and party: there was a powerful Buenos Ayrean party, in fact, even in Montevideo.* The war was between a Federal party; and mixed up with this hatred was a bitter personal rivalry between the leaders—a rivalry of such extent that it was impossible that any reconciliation between those Generals could be hoped for.

(18th May, 1844, Times.)

In reply to the question which had been put, he was not prepared to say that there would be any forcible intervention on the part of England. *If our rights as a nation were violated by either party, Her Majesty's Government were of course determined, by force if necessary, to defend the interests of this country; but so long as the laws of nations were not violated, he was sure the House would with him see the importance of those considerations, which restrained any interference on the part of the Queen's Government. No doubt England could very well suppress the hostilities which were at present going forward, and might for a time establish peaceful relations; but what security would that furnish for a continuance of a state of peace? How could peace be rendered permanent unless we maintained on the spot that force by which hostilities were in the first instance*

lities by force, because, even if we succeeded, the moment we turned our backs they would be sure to commence again; and yet we are now committing this very folly which he so well exposed. On another occasion he stated,‡ that Rosas had a perfect right to institute a blockade of Montevideo, and that this country would acknowledge it:—and yet at the very same period of time our Minister at Buenos Ayres was obstinately refusing to do so, and shortly after proceeded himself to institute a blockade of Buenos Ayres, because that Government insisted on doing what our Prime Minister was saying they had a perfect right to do. It is quite impossible to imagine any satisfactory solution of these contradictions, but such serious evils will result from a continued departure from the sound views contained in the declarations referred to, that it is to be hoped Ministers will not be slow in returning to them.

(*To be concluded.*)

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terminated? In such a case this country would have to take upon itself the whole internal government of both the contending countries. He believed that France took pretty much the same view of the question that this country did, and that all good offices had been offered by France with a view to the amicable arrangement of the differences which existed; but France, he had no doubt, agreed with England, that no forcible intervention ought at the present moment to take place. Let the House only look at the consequences of such a precedent as that of a neutral State, greatly superior in power, interfering forcibly in the foreign relations, and therefore necessarily in the internal government of another State. *Such a right did not exist by the law of nations*; and if such a step were taken, other powerful States might likewise interfere, and we should then possess no right to remonstrate. On these grounds he must say that he thought England ought to pause before she set any example of interference. All he could promise, therefore, was continued attention to the subject which the Honourable Gentleman had brought under the consideration of the House; but he could not promise on the part of this country, and he did not expect that there would be on the part of France, any exercise of force.

14th July, 1845, (Morning Post.)

Sir Robert Peel.—Any information which I can give on the subject consistently with public interests I shall willingly accord to the Honourable Member.

The state of the case is this:—Rosas, in the exercise of his belligerent rights towards Montevideo, has a right to institute a blockade. We were disposed to admit that right on his part, provided the blockade was universal in its operation; but the French Government contested the right, and claimed that their vessels should have exemption. We then refused to admit the right to blockade unless it applied to vessels of all nations.

Since that time we have reason to believe that the French Government acquiesced in the right, and permitted its application to French vessels; whereupon we, providing that it was universal, consented to recognise the belligerent rights of Rosas as far as Montevideo was concerned.

The Honourable Member also wishes to know whether Rosas had a right to prevent the ingress of our vessels into Paraguay. I believe that with respect to the large Rivers Paraguay and Paraná, Rosas occupies both banks and claims the right of stopping the navigation in consequence of his occupation of those banks.

I think that he has no right in consequence of his blockade to prevent vessels entering the Plate, but whether he has a right to occupy the banks I am not prepared to say. Now the Honourable Member is aware that certain operations are in contemplation, by which it is hoped tranquility will be restored; but in case any party wishes to have the best information respecting mercantile transactions, I should recommend such party to apply directly to the Foreign Office, where the best information will at once be given.

I give this general information in answer to the Honourable Member's question; but parties immediately interested had better apply directly to my noble friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

‡ Ibid.

[From the "Morning Chronicle," 19th Feb., 1846.]

We have already stated our belief that Government had interfered in the affairs of the River Plate in total ignorance both of the circumstances of the case and the character of the parties they had to deal with; and a persusal of Lord Aberdeen's instructions to Mr. Ouseley, just laid before Parliament, confirms us in this opinion. So ill adapted are these instructions to the realties of the case, that were the author known as a writer of works of fiction, one might almost suppose them to have been intended originally as a chapter in a diplomatic novel, where, as he would have been at liberty to fashion his characters and events to match his diplomacy, they might not have looked so much amiss. Viewed in relation to real men and things, as actually existing in the River Plate, any child from that quarter of the world could have told him that they were altogether inapplicable, and would prove a failure.

The state of things Mr. Ouseley had to deal with when he arrived, as the instructions express it "at his post," may be very briefly described. The wanton aggressors on a neighbouring and friendly Power, at first successful, had, after a severe struggle, in their turn suffered the evils they were the first to inflict, and met with the retaliation their unprovoked aggression merited. The war he was commissioned to terminate was at an end. His mission of pacification had been anticipated. Nobody remained in arms but the foreigners in Montevideo.

In the "instructions," under a profusion of professions of "strict impartiality," all this is blinked. Lord Aberdeen, shutting his eyes on the numerous provocations Buenos Ayres had received from Montevideo—the repeated invasions of her soil, the devastation of her territory, the massacre of her subjects—declares to her face that the war *on her side* is without "*any substancial and national object.*" Affecting to look upon the victors and the vanquished—the lawfully elected magistrate and the usurper, the *de facto* and *de jure* President General Oribe and the fugitive Rivera—as on a footing of perfect equality, he proposes his conditions accordingly. Reversing the language of Scripture, he determines that from those that have all—right and possession—shall be taken all that they have; and to those who have lost all shall be returned all they have lost, and even more beside.

Nor is any *quid pro quo* to be offered to the victorious party for these concessions. On the contrary, they are merely to be preliminaries to others. After they have given up everything, then "the terms upon "which peace shall be finally settled may be pro-"perly left to the united mediation of the friendly "Powers, to be discussed and recommended to the "two principal parties." Then were to come the demands for the navigation of the interior waters, which, once humbled, there would be the less spirit to resist. Then was to be extorted the "something "more than security from future aggression, which "Montevideo may be entitled to require from Buenos "Ayres," and which we may suppose to mean either the removal of General Rosas from power, or—what is more probable the cession to Montevideo of the two most valuable Argentine provinces, Corrientes and Entrerios, on which a party in Montevideo have long had their eye.

But the child might be refractory, and not do as he was bid. He might refuse to come and kneel down, beg pardon, and trust to what Messrs. Ouseley and Deffaudis would give him. If so, "a kindly "warning," which he was to be told was not a "threat," that "the means of accomplishing our ob-"jects were at hand," was to be administered. If still disobedient, it was "to be urged upon him in a "more formal and *solemn* manner;" and "whatever "may have been his hopes and intentions up to that "moment, *it is hardly possible to conceive* that "when the consequences which must follow from a "refusal to listen to the advice of the two Powers "shall have been made evident to him, he will allow "it to pass unheeded." Vain hope! He did allow both protestations, and warnings, and threats, and advice to pass unheeded. And why! Because neither Rosas nor Oribe are the ignorant *gauchos* which would have suited Lord Aberdeen's diplomatic novel, but both men competent to write nearly as pertinent and persuasive a despatch as the "instructions."

The species of *engouement* which seems to have possessed Lord Aberdeen with regard to Montevideo, would be amusing if it were not so pernicious. Hitherto there had evidently been a void in his diplomatic heart which only Montevideo was destined to fill. So exclusively does she monopolise his sympathies that he has none left for any other. Poor Buenos Ayres might be, and was well-nigh trodden under foot by her, but he heeded it not. The independence of France outlived our rough intrusion into her private affairs in 1814-15; but that of Montevideo is a more precious thing, and must on no account be meddled with. Not even "*secretly, by* "*the aid of money or other influence*," will Lord Aberdeen tolerate that her neighbour "shall give "support to General Oribe's case"—that is, we suppose, if he can prevent it. Nor will "her Ma-"jesty's Government be disposed to sanction, either "on their own part or on that of others, any inter-"ference in the internal affairs of Montevideo"—excepting, of course, the present one, to relieve her from the consequences of her own unjust acts.

"What is one man's meat is another man's "poison;" and it appears that the charms of Montevideo are no so highly prized by those diplomatists who have had a closer knowledge of her. The Honourable William Brent, jun., Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Ayres, thus describes the admired of our Foreign Secretary, in a memorandum dated the 29th of May last:—

"I asked who was the Oriental Republic of Uru-"guay. It could not be the foreigners who know "nothing of constitutional rights, and who had been "the instruments of destroying the constitution as "mediated by Great Britain and guaranteed by Brazil "and Buenos Ayres.

"It could not be men who would throw up their "caps, and as they went up cry, *vive l' Empereur*; "and as they came down, *á bas l' Empereur*; or "as they went up, *vivent les sans culottes*; and as they came down, *á bas les sans culottes.*

"I said that the number of the Oriental citizens "of the Oriental republic of the Uruguay in "Monte Video was very small, and that most if not "all these had remained because they knew not "where to go, or were induced to remain to save "their property from destruction and pillage the mo-"ment they left Montevideo."

It cannot be matter of surprise that pretensions so entirely one-sided, and so disproportioned to the relative position of the parties, as we have shown Lord Aberdeen's to be, should be rejected by that one of the two who saw that, in spite of a great many sugared words, he was required to make all the sacrifices. And so far from being frightened by the terrors which they were told were in store for them, it is evident that both General Oribe and General Rosas knew too well the security of their positions to be at all affected by them. Lord Aberdeen might fancy that "the blockade of the "Buceo and the occupation of the lower waters of "the Uruguay would effectually cut off all inter-"course between Buenos Ayres and General Oribe's "forces, and thereby compel their retreat or dissolu-"tion," but *they* knew differently. Indeed, when it is remembered that Buenos Ayres has twice stood out a nearly three years' blockade, and Monte Video a three years' close siege, we are at a loss to understand on what grounds Lord Aberdeen could, in this instance, expect such great results from such trifling measures. The occupation of the lower waters of the Uruguay may *retard* the communication between Buenos Ayres and General Oribe, but does not intercept it; nor does the blockade of the Buceo inflict any serious inconvenience upon him, as there are other quarters from which he can and does draw his necessary supplies. These, besides, are limited to a very few articles, for the principal and most important ones are abundant in the country over which he holds undisputed sway.

There can be no doubt whatever that in all these matters—whether the merits of the dispute, the relative position of the parties engaged in it, or the means we possess of controlling or coercing them —Lord Aberdeen has been grossly deceived by the parties who have urged forward the intervention. Oribe would move off the moment we showed we were serious in requiring it; Brazil would join us, and afford her aid; Paraguay would declare war against Buenos Ayres; the Correntinos were to do we know not what; lastly, the Buenos Ayreans themselves would rise and overthrow the Government! All these things were predicted, and each by itself was sufficient to conclude the affair. But six months have elapsed, and not one has happened.

On the other hand, things have taken place that were not set down in the programme. The unauthorized change of destination of two regiments, or detachments of them, has annoyed "the Duke." The gratuitous and purposeless invasion of the Argentine Waters at so great a sacrifice of human life, has thwarted her Majesty's benevolent wish to put an end to the distressing calamities of war in countries otherwise so favoured. And last though not least, the wholesale destruction of British property and ruin of British merchants, in a senseless endeavour to coerce two foreign rulers by means of injuries inflicted upon our own subjects, has filled the measure of folly and thoughtlessness from which all these proceedings have originated.

We believe wiser counsels have lately had the sway; but whether they will be in time to prevent many evils, or not, remains to be seen.

MARINE LIST.

PORT of BUENOS AYRES.

June 6.—*Wind N., in the afternoon ehanged ta N. E.*

No arrivals or sailings.

June 7.—*Wind S.*

No arrivals or sailings.

June 8.—*Wind E.S.E.—foggy.*

No arrivals or sailings.

June 9.—*Wind S.S.E.*

No arrivals or sailings.

June 10.—*Wind S.S.E., hazy.*

No arrivals or sailings.

June 11.—*Wind E.*

No arrivals or sailings.

June 12.—*Wind E., a heavy rain during the day.*

No arrivals or sailings.

MERCHANT VESSELS

IN THE PORT OF BUENOS AYRES ON FRIDAY LAST.

NONE.

FOREIGN VESSELS OF WAR.

BRITISH.—Ship Melampus, 42 guns, Captain John Norman Campbell.

Brig Racer, 16 guns, Captain Archibald Reed.

FRENCH—Brig Adonis, 20 guns, Capt. Colet.

SARDINIAN—Brig Daino, 14 guns, Captain Chevalier Scaffiero.

Blockade of the Port of Buenos Ayres by the combined Anglo-French squadron.

June 8.—A French launch was this morning seen at anchor in the direction of Port Quilmes; the Adonis and Racer fired each a gun, whereupon the launch proceeded to the former vessel.

11th.—A launch from the Melampus went this morning to the Racer and returned again to the Melampus.

This day (13th inst.) completes the 259th day of the blockade.

THERMOMETER in the Mirador of the Commercial Room since our last:—

Saturday.....48
Sunday.....52
Monday.....49
Tuesday.....51
Wednesday.....54
Thursday.....57
Friday.....59

We are still without any direct information respecting the operations of Rivera; but letters from Montevideo state that a bulletin had been published there announcing that he had gained some advantages over Col. Montoro. Allowing that Rivera has in this instance deviated from his uniform system of deception, we are persuaded that as soon as he dares to penetrate into the interior beyond the possibility of regaining the transports protected by the Anglo-French naval forces, an effectual stop will be promptly put to his devastating progress.

The predatory Indians of the desert, whose visits since General Rosas' memorable expedition are, happily, but "few and far between," lately made an incursion into the department of the North, when General Pacheco immediately detached from the army of the centre a strong column under the command of Major Bustos in pursuit of the invaders. This column penetrated into the heart of the desert and surprised the Indians in their wigwams. The result has been that upwards of 60 fighting Indians, including two Caciques, have been killed and 5 taken prisoners; 900 sheep, 200 and odd head of cattle, 160 mares and 470 horses, as also large deposits of Indian corn, pumpkins and other provisions, falling, besides, into the hands of the victors.

According to the last news from Entrerios, General Urquiza and General Joaquin Madariaga were on the eve of having an interview on the frontier, for the purpose of finally settling the terms on which the pacification of Corrientes is to be effected.

On the 17th inst., the merchants and proprietors held the annual election of members to constitute the Tribunal of Commerce during the next year; when the following gentlemen were chosen by a considerable majority:—

Don José Maria Rojas, *Prior.*
" Manuel G. Pintos, *Vice do.*
" Inocencio Escalada, *First Consul.*
" Vicente Cazon, *Vice do.*
" Bonifacio Huergo, *Second Consul.*
" José J. Garmendia, *Vice do.*
" Juan B. Molina, *Syndic.*
" Pedro Duval, *Vice do.*

On the 4th inst., a boat belonging to the United States ship *Plymouth* was capsized in the bay of Montevideo, and five of the crew were drowned.

Advertisements.

George Temperley,

(Late Temperley and Baasch)

HOSIER AND HABERDASHER

No. 21, Calle de Cangallo,

BEGS leave to inform his friends and the public that he carries on the above Establishment, with a complete assortment of hosiery, &c., consisting of gentlemen's French silk hats, of the very best quality and latest fashions, silk and satin cravats, scarfs, stocks, opera ties, handkerchiefs, gloves, braces, woollen and cotton hose and half hose, childrens' do., woollen shirts and drawers, bed rugs, table covers, men and boys' cloth caps, white and coloured shirts, cloth brushes, hair and tooth do.; also a complete assortment of boots, half-boots, shoes and brogans, gentlemen's dressing cases, razors, writing desks, cigar cases, fancy walking sticks, and various other articles, all selling at the lowest possible prices.

Notice.

THE Partnership hitherto existing between George Temperley and Julius Baasch, is mutually dissolved, and all accounts against the firm of Temperley and Baasch will be settled by George Temperley, who is carrying on the business as heretofore.

GEORGE TEMPERLEY.
JULIUS BAASCH.

May 29, 1846.

SCOTCH WHISKEY, real Highland Blair Athol, true peat flavour.

PORT WINE, a few cases, being part of the stock of the late George Portis.

DUBLIN PORTER, in bottles, XXX from Manders and Powell, Dublin, at the Store of John Blues, Calle de la Reconquista No. 149, being the remainder of a stock, will be sold at a low price.

The following cheap Works may be had at cost price at the Buenos Ayres Commercial Rooms:—

Rody the Rover; or, the Ribbonman, by Wm. Carleton.
Droll Dramas for Christmas Comedians and Parlour Performers, by R. M. Evans.
Chambers's Miscellany.
The Cricket on the Heath, by Charles Dickens.
The Juvenile Museum.
The Knitting Book, (second series) by Miss Lambert
The Countess Faustina, by Ida, Countess Hahn Hahn, (translated from the German.)
The Amber Witch.

June 6, 1846.

Notice.

THE undersigned being about to leave the country for a short time, begs to inform the public that his business during his absence will be managed by Mr. SAMUEL RENSHAW PHIBBS. All persons having any claims against the undersigned are requested to send their accounts to be liquidated immediately.

Saladero del Alto, Buenos Ayres, May 26, 1846.

WILLIAM DOWNES.

ADVERTISEMENT.

ALL Persons indebted to A. Cameron are requested to call at the Store No. 46 Calle de la Reconquista, and settle their accounts without delay. A. C. likewise begs to intimate to those to whom he may be indebted that by presenting their accounts at the abovementioned Store they will obtain immediate attention.

Omnibus and Volantas,

FOR the THORNDIKE RERTAURANT, will leave the corner of Corrientes aud Alameda Streets, at morning and evening on feast days. Families wising to visit the Quinta, can have either of the vehicles to call at their residence, on any day required, by leaving written orders the day previous at the Quinta, or at 113, Piedad Stteet.

Pegged Boots, Shoes, and Brogans.

THE Subscribers respectfully advise the public that they have established, on the most approved method, a manufacture of the abovementioned articles; they have secured experienced workmen, and use only the best materials. The public is requested to call and examine the stock of Boots Shoes and Brogans, which are fresh, and will be sold to suit purchasers, at prices lower than they have ever been intreduced for from abroad. A liberal discount will be made to persons purchasing lots to sell retail.

THOMAS WIRE & CO.,
113, Piedad Street

Egg, Krutisch & Co.

HAVE Removed their Establishment from Calle Perú, No 86, to Calle Universidad, No. 172.

PILOT CLOTH, considerably under the market price, for Sale at No. 55 Calle Piedad, also, Merino shirts and drawers.

REQUIRED to go to the country, a Female Servant of all work, for a small family. Unexceptionable character is indispensable. Apply at No. 13 Calle Maypú.

BIRTH.

On the 7th inst., the lady of the Rev. A. L. Ziegel, of a daughter.

PRICES CURRENT.

	$		$	
Doubloons, Spanish	406	á	407	each
Do Patriot	405	á	406	do.
Plata, macuquina	19	á	20	do. for one
Dollars, Spanish	24½	á	25	each.
Do. Patriot & Patacones	24	á	24½	do.
Six per cent. Stock	80	á	82	do. per cent.
Exchange on England	$2\frac{1}{16}$	á	$2\frac{1}{8}$d.	
Do. France	23	á	23½	cent. per dollar
Do. Rio Janeiro	3			per ct. premium
Do. Montevideo	6	á		do.
Do. United States	20	á	22	
Hides, Ox, for Engld & Germy	49	á	50	per pesada
Do. France	42	á	46	do.
Do. North America	40	á	42	do.
Do. Spain	45	á	50	do.
Do. salted	41	á	42	do.
Do. Horse	22	á	25	do. each
Calf skins	40	á	50	per pesada
Sheep skins, common	22	á	24	per dozen
Do. fine	32	á	34	do.
Deer skins	withoutprice			do.
Goat skins	do.			do.
Nutria skins	2¼	á	2½	dol. per lb
Chinchilli skins	no price.			dol. per dozen
Horse hair, short	35	á	40	dol. per arroba
Do. mixed	46	á	52	do.
Do. long	100	á	120	do.
Wool, common, washed	18	á	22	do
Do. picked	withoutprice			do.
Do. shorn from skins	do.			do.
Do. mestiza, dirty	12	á	30	do
Tallow, pure	23	á	25	do.
Do. raw	15	á	17	do.
Do. with grease	18	á	19	do.
Jerked beef	withoutprice			per quintal.
Horns, mixed	75	á	100	per thousand
Do. Ox	300	á	400	do.
Shin bones	withoutprice			do.
Hide cuttings	8	á	10	per 100 lbs.
Ostrich feathers, white	withoutprice			per lb.
Do. black	9	á	10	do.
Salted tongues	7	á	8	per dozen
Salt, on board	none.			per fanega.
Discount	1½	á	2½	per cent. month

The highest price of Doubloons during the week 407 dollars.
The lowest price 400 dollars.
The highest rate of Exchange upon England during the week 2 1-8. The lowest do. 2 1-16d.

GEORGE THOMAS, Responsible Editor.